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Oover the past years, the Hungarian tax system has been transformed substantially. This meant the introduction of new taxes as much as the frequent modification of the rules of existing ones. A symbolic element of such tax 
changes was the reform of the personal income 
taxation, which the government implemented 
over a period of three years, between 2010 and 
2013. In addition to merging and reducing 
tax rates, the restructuring, publicly known as 
the flat tax reform, also included the abolition 
of the super grossing system, the phasing out 
of tax credits, and the major expansion of the 
existing family tax allowance scheme.
The issue deserves and is paid all the more 
attention as personal income taxation is 
closely linked to several other government 
functions. It contributes nearly 15 per cent 
of all tax revenues to the funding of pub-
lic expenditures. compared to most taxes, 
it has a primary role in state redistribution 
as well. Moreover, it may also contribute to 
macroeconomic stability through its poten-
tial progressivity, operating as an automatic 
stabiliser (Tóth, 2010).
for these reasons, it is worth examining in 
detail what consequences the transformation 
of the Hungarian personal income taxation 
has (had). of all the dimensions which may 
be and are worth being examined, our study 
primarily focuses on two closely related as-
pects. The objective of our study is to precisely 
map, quantify and describe the impact of the 
flat tax reform on the tax burden of certain E-mail address: tothgcs@gmail.com
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social groups, the consequent changes in in-
come distribution in Hungary between 2010 
and 2013, as well as the implications of the 
reform for the budget. Moreover, we have ap-
plied similar aspects to examine what conse-
quences a reduction of the currently effective 
tax rate of 16 per cent to 9 per cent would 
have, knowing that this possibility has been 
discussed among the long term plans of the 
government.
It must be emphasised that the proportion 
of tax burdens imposed on different social 
classes is primarily a value choice and not an 
issue of economics.1 on the other hand, in-
come tax is only one instrument among the 
many instruments of state redistribution, and 
as such, it may not in itself be used to assess 
state redistribution. Therefore, our research 
objective was not to give an evaluation of the 
tax policy, but to describe the results induced 
by the change along two highlighted dimen-
sions. our analysis follows the logic of posi-
tive economics, as we strive to focus on the 
description of the operation and behavioural 
relationships of a particular economic system. 
As Erdős (2012) puts it, this type of study, as 
opposed to normative economics, never ex-
presses value judgements, but offers a descrip-
tion of a particular system, explaining how it 
functions and defining what reactions it may 
be characterised by.
following an introduction, the second 
part of the study gives an overview of in-
ternational experiences, while in the third 
part we review research studies relating to 
the Hungarian tax system. subsequently, we 
shall briefly describe the methodology of the 
analysis, and present our findings. In the first 
step, the tax reform is considered as a whole, 
and then the effects of the certain measures 
are decomposed separately. finally, we pro-
vide an assessment of the potential conse-
quences of the introduction of a single digit 
(9 per cent) tax rate.
InteRnAtIOnAl exAmples  
AnD expeRIence
The implementation of a flat rate personal 
income tax is by no means unprecedented in 
the European union; there are several member 
states using this type of tax system for some 
time.2 on the continent, the successor states 
of the soviet union were the first to introduce 
a flat rate personal income tax: Estonia and 
Lithuania in 1994 and Latvia in 1997. of 
the Visegrád countries, Hungary followed 
slovakia (2004) and the czech Republic 
(2008) in 2011.
The proliferation of the flat rate tax is 
closely related to the fact that the tax reforms 
implemented in the countries of the Euro-
pean union over the past decades have been 
designed to serve three major purposes: to re-
duce taxes on labour, to gain advantage from 
the price competition arising from globalisa-
tion and to simplify taxation. The latter has 
been most apparent in measures which com-
bine the reduction of tax rates and the expan-
sion of the tax base (Kiss et al., 2008). While 
the flat tax reform, typical only of central and 
Eastern European countries, is indeed in line 
with these efforts, Western European states 
have chosen to adopt changes in their pro-
gressive tax systems to match the trends.
When examining the determinants under-
lying such changes, one must take note of the 
study of Pires and Jensen (2011) which con-
cludes that the distorting effect of flat tax sys-
tems on economic processes may be smaller 
compared to multiple rate schemes, where the 
effect takes hold through multiple channels. 
first, there is a stronger incentive effect as rev-
enues increase in proportion to productivity 
as a result of the smoothing out of the mar-
ginal tax rate. second, the simplification of 
the tax system entails lower tax planning costs 
for employees, employers and the government 
alike, thus it improves efficiency both directly 
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and indirectly. Moreover, the study highlights 
that a flat tax reform may boost entrepreneur-
ship and may positively impact foreign oper-
ating capital inflow.3
Accordingly, governments tend to expect 
the implementation of a flat tax system to 
induce the expansion of labour supply, the 
reduction of tax evasion and the decrease of 
administrative costs (Kiss et al., 2008). Nev-
ertheless, there is very little robust empirical 
evidence for a valid assessment of the reforms. 
The assessment of changes is made all the 
more difficult as the implemented flat tax sys-
tems do differ in several aspects, thus the ef-
fects of flat tax systems cannot be described in 
general (Keen et al., 2006).
The most widely proclaimed positive out-
come is that tax evasion may indeed be re-
duced, as it was pointed out in the paper of 
Ivanova et al. (2005) in relation to the Russian 
tax reform. Saavedra (2007) also concluded 
that flat tax reforms may improve taxation 
morale provided that the reform is accom-
panied with the simplification of the tax ad-
ministration. The author also claims that a flat 
tax reform may positively impact the com-
petitiveness and the growth of the economy. 
Those who emphasise the growth impact of 
the tax reform mainly refer to the Baltic states 
and slovakia as examples: these countries saw 
a prompt and steady growth of the GDP after 
they implemented a flat tax system. However, 
Erdős (2012) warns that growth may not ex-
clusively be the result of the tax reforms, but 
there were several other factors which also 
contributed to the acceleration of the expan-
sion. The recovery period following the major 
economic recession in the years preceding the 
reform, other economic policy measures, the 
level of development of labour markets and 
the foreign operating capital inflow all have 
contributed to the recovery, offering a stimu-
lus to these economies to a greater extent that 
the tax reform, Erdős (2012) claims.
Based on a detailed examination of coun-
tries which implemented flat tax regimes, 
Kiss et al. (2008) also came to the conclusion 
that reforms did not clearly deliver the results 
they were expected to bring about in terms of 
growth and tax revenues.4 Nevertheless, there 
was a certain side-effect related to the redistri-
bution of incomes in all the cases. According to 
the authors, there may be ways to improve the 
efficiency of a tax system at a lower social cost.5
The popularity of flat tax systems seems to 
wane these days, which is well reflected in the 
changes adopted, or postponed for that mat-
ter, in two of the Visegrád countries. While in 
2008 Poland was considering the possibility 
to transform their classical progressive taxa-
tion into a flat tax system, the economic cri-
sis has clearly swept away these endeavours. In 
slovakia the government abolished the flat tax 
system in 2013 by adopting a second, 25 per 
cent tax rate in addition to the existing 19 per 
cent rate. The concept of differentiated income 
taxation arose in our Eastern neighbour, Ro-
mania, as well, in 2012. To help lower-income 
taxpayers, the government was planning to add 
two lower personal income tax rates (8 and 12 
per cent) to the existing 16 per cent rate into 
the flat tax system the country implemented in 
2005.6 This, however, is not feasible in the cur-
rent budget situation, so its implementation is 
most certainly not going to happen this year.7
lessOns leARneD FROm HUngARIAn 
pROFessIOnAl lIteRAtURe
Although Hungary adopted a flat tax system 
in 2011, there have been several studies on the 
very same subject matter since the mid 2000s. 
Benedek and Lelkes (2006) examined income 
redistribution in Hungary, and considered 
the possible effects of a flat tax system as early 
as five years before the tax reform was indeed 
implemented. similarly to the present paper, 
 focus – The impact of economic legislation on real processes  
372
their research focused on the redistribution 
impact of a flat rate tax. The parameters they 
applied in their hypothetical tax system relied 
on the fundaments of the slovakian tax re-
form, but they chose to model a simpler 
system: personal income tax and value-added 
tax rates were set at 20 per cent, they retained 
the tax credit system, but abolished all other 
tax allowances. The research findings revealed 
that – not considering the top quintiles of 
income distribution – personal income tax 
liabilities would not change significantly. It 
would, nevertheless, considerably reduce the 
tax burden on the wealthiest. At the same 
time, the VAT payable would be larger in all 
deciles due to the unification of the VAT rate. 
As a combined result of these two factors, 
the beneficiaries of the tax reform would be 
higher-income taxpayers, while the losers 
would be lower-income individuals. With 
such a hypothetical tax system 15–15 per 
cent of the households would gain or lose, 
in comparison to the tax regime of 2006. 
Winners would be mainly those in the top 
deciles, while the proportion of losers would 
be over 10 per cent in all deciles, but their 
distribution would be the highest in the 
middle range. The final conclusion of the 
paper is that such a tax system would reduce 
the redistribution of income and would thus 
deteriorate social solidarity.
The study of Bakos et al. (2008a) also fo-
cused on the assessment of income distribu-
tion effects. Additionally, the authors also 
sought to answer the question of how much 
growth and revenue effects of flat tax reforms 
correlate with the change of tax rates and how 
much with a more stringent tax collection 
policy. The findings of their empirical research 
revealed that with 0.06 the ratio of overall tax 
elasticity is relatively low in Hungary, which 
implies that a reduction of the marginal tax 
rates would produce a lower than expected 
economic stimulus. Nevertheless, with a value 
exceeding 0.3, the behavioural impact (elas-
ticity) is higher in the wealthier segment, 
which suggests a possibility for a consider-
able growth of labour supply.8 According to 
the authors, this however, amplifies the redis-
tribution effects of the flat tax reform. from 
their simulation of a flat rate personal income 
tax system, they concluded that as a result 
of the behavioural impact, budget revenues 
and taxable income would grow by a moder-
ate 2 and 1.4 per cent, respectively.9 At the 
same time, such a reform would cause major 
changes in income distribution, the burden of 
which would primarily be borne by taxpayers 
with medium income.
similarly to our study, the research of 
Benczúr et al. (2011a) focused not (only) on 
a hypothetical tax reform, but on one which 
was actually implemented. In their paper they 
used a microsimulation model, expanded with 
behavioural impact, to quantify anticipated 
long term labour market, growth and budget 
effects. The change made to the tax system in 
201110 triggers a 2.6 per cent increase in long 
term labour supply, while its impact on em-
ployment is negligible. According to the au-
thors’ estimates, the balance of the budget will 
deteriorate by Huf 93 billion as a result of 
the measure, while GDP is expected to grow 
by 2.4 per cent. Growth appeared to be a few 
percentage points higher (2.9 per cent) when 
the authors took into consideration the full-
scale removal of super grossing and tax credits, 
an additional one percentage point increase of 
the contribution and the increase of the VAT. 
The whole package would improve the bal-
ance of the budget by Huf 212 billion, but 
the number of persons employed would de-
crease by 0.8 per cent.
Erdős (2012) studied the short term effects 
of the flat tax and other, simultaneous econom-
ic policy measures (banking and crisis taxes, 
schemes designed to aid foreign currency debt-
ors). one of the most important assumptions 
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of the study is that the weaker than expected 
economic stimulus may be traced back to both 
the demand and the supply sides. on the de-
mand side, the problem Erdős (2012) identifies 
is that the net income growth of wealthier in-
dividuals does not end up in internal demand 
but significantly increases import demand.11 
The study also concludes that while the savings 
of wealthier taxpayers seem to be sensitive to 
changes in the tax system, the aggregate savings 
in the country failed to grow. Now as a result, 
the budget deficit grows by an amount corre-
sponding to the surplus income of the wealthy 
population from the tax measures. on the sup-
ply side, Erdős (2012) highlights the limiting 
effect of other economic policy measures. The 
study traces back the moderate employment 
(supply) impact to the fact that supplementing 
economic policy measures, adopted to offset 
the deficit increasing effect of tax cuts, under-
mined the banking system’s willingness to lend.
Cseres – Gergely and Simonovits (2011) ex-
amined how the transformation of the personal 
income tax system, to be completed in 2013, 
affects the development of pensions and the 
pension fund through net incomes. As pen-
sions are calculated on the basis of net wages, 
tax cuts impose an additional burden on the 
state pension fund and thus on the whole of 
the budget. Their calculations suggest that in 
the first year the changes will deteriorate the 
balance of the pension fund by 0.2 per cent of 
the GDP, and this loss is expected to accelerate 
in proportion to the growth rate of real wages.
some of the papers which examine the tax 
reform commenced in 2011 (for instance, 
Benczúr et al., 2011a; Benedek and Kiss, 2011; 
cseres–Gergely and simonovits, 2011) also 
touch upon the tax reform’s impact on income 
distribution, and the assertions made in that 
relation tend to be relatively consistent. But 
because none of the researches actually focus 
on the issue (and thus only a limited section 
of the papers is devoted to describing their 
findings), it seems appropriate and desirable to 
thoroughly look into the matter, particularly as 
today we know all the details of the tax reform, 
implemented over a period of several years and 
completed in 2013, for certain.
metHODOlOgy
In the assessment of the tax reform we have 
applied a microsimulation method for our 
analysis, as this procedure allows for the effects 
of one or several economic policy measures to 
be examined at the level of basic units of the 
economy (individual, household or company). 
In the case of the tax simulation underlying 
our research it means that from a database 
composed of personal income tax returns, 
we calculate tax liabilities for each taxpayer 
individually and under different scenarios using 
a database management application and the 
available information. We can then aggregate 
or group the data calculated accordingly for 
the intended purposes of the analysis. The 
advantages of this methodology include the 
possibility to take the distribution of certain 
economic variables into account, which in turn 
enables the calculation of non-linear change of 
rules, while we can also model the interaction 
of different rules as well as the behaviour 
of taxpayers (Benedek and Kiss, 2011). As 
microsimulation allows for the examination of 
the combined effect of one or several measures 
from the aspects of different social groups, the 
method is a crucial instrument of economic 
policy impact studies.12
The widespread dissemination of the mi-
crosimulation method took place in three 
major waves in Hungary. The first one dates 
back to the mid eighties when the central 
statistical office and later the Economic Re-
search Institute used this procedure mainly 
for improving the quality of data collection, 
for preparing forecasts and at times for con-
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ducting impact studies. It was a significant 
breakthrough when the Ministry of finance 
and TÁRKI concluded a cooperation agree-
ment in 2004. The primary purpose of the 
researches conducted in the above mentioned 
institutes was to examine the redistribution 
effect of the tax and subsidy system, usually 
by linking the personal income tax database 
to the Household Budget survey which was 
designed to document the budgeting of indi-
vidual families (Benedek and Lelkes, 2006). 
subsequently, several publications were pro-
duced both within the EcosTAT (cserháti 
et al., 2007, 2009, 2012; cserháti and Takács, 
2010; Belyó et al., 2009) and within the fiscal 
council (Benedek and Kiss, 2011) which re-
lied on this method. The examinations listed 
in the foregoing were generally static analyses 
which took neither individuals’ reactions, nor 
the consequent spillover macroeconomic ef-
fects into account. from this aspect, the re-
search of Benczúr et al. (2011a) was a major 
step forward, as they also used new empirical 
analyses (Kiss and Mosberger, 2011; Benczúr 
et al., 2011b), increasingly trying to take the 
above mentioned effects into consideration.13
In terms of its methodology, our research 
belongs to the second wave, also because it 
disregards several other (labour market, de-
mographic) consequences of the tax reform. 
our examination is based on personal income 
tax returns from 201114, which is a novel fea-
ture compared to previous researches from 
two aspects. firstly, because we do not work 
with a sample but with the entire population, 
and as a result our database, after having ap-
plied the appropriate filters, is composed of 
the anonymised personal income tax returns 
of all 4,372,042 private individuals who had 
taxable income in 2011. secondly, former tax 
returns did not state how many dependent 
children were raised by the taxpayers, since 
only those with three or more children were 
eligible to a tax relief.15 Thus, for the calcula-
tion of the effects of the expanded family al-
lowance, this datum had to be estimated from 
other databases with significant uncertainty. 
The 2011 database, however, already included 
the number of dependent children, which 
substantially reduces the uncertainty about 
the accuracy of the impact study.
It must be noted, however, that from sev-
eral aspects our examination may be classi-
fied as a static analysis. on the one hand, we 
disregarded behavioural effects. on the other 
hand, we did not index the database, in other 
words, the scenarios based on the different le-
gal framework of the particular years (2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013) were all examined on the 
same 2011 database without adjusting either 
the parameters of the individual taxpayers (e.g.: 
income), or the whole of the population (with 
new entrants into or those exiting the labour 
market) using a variety of estimation meth-
ods. We did not abandon the latter because 
of technical or methodological constraints but 
because our objective was to describe the direct 
effects of tax changes independently of the de-
mographic, labour market or other processes.
To that end, in performing the simulations, 
we took account of the different taxation rules 
in force in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, in 
particular of the change of tax rates (also for 
incomes which are taxed separately), of the 
abolition and phasing out of tax credits and 
super grossing in two stages, and of the signif-
icant expansion of the family tax allowance.
FInDIngs
The impact of  the tax reform on  
the spreading of  the tax burden
According to the findings of our simulations, the 
tax changes adopted between 2010 and 2013 
resulted in a tax reduction of Huf 444 billion. 
since each of the measures had very different 
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impact on the different social groups, it is 
worth examining these changes along a variety 
of dimensions. In order to ensure that we 
can analyse the results of our calculations as 
a function of the income, we have created 
income deciles on the basis of taxable gross16 
incomes. As a great proportion of taxpayers 
who completed the tax return did not have 
income every month, dividing the annual data 
by 12 does not automatically produce monthly 
incomes. In general, we can say that individuals 
in the first three income groups did not have full 
time employment throughout the whole year17, 
those in the fourth decile earned a minimum 
wage for 12 months, and taxpayers earning 
an average wage were in the eighth decile. It 
should be noted that in the top income decile 
the average value does not necessarily provide 
a precise picture of the taxpayers in the group, 
as the distribution is fairly asymmetric due to 
the outstandingly high income of some of the 
members. (The same applies to the results of 
the simulations as well.)
As a result of the changes, the tax bur-
den on the bottom seven income deciles in-
creased by a total of Huf  134  billion. The 
tax of the eighth decile dropped slightly, that 
of the ninth decile decreased by Huf 72 bil-
lion, while the tax of those with the high-
est incomes shrank by Huf 501 billion (see 
Table 1). As a result of the processes men-
tioned, the contribution of the tenth decile 
(with the highest income) to the total tax 
revenues dropped from 61 per cent to 42 per 
cent. This proportion did not change marked-
ly in the ninth decile, while that of taxpayers 
with lower incomes increased substantially.
In terms of individual taxpayers this means 
that the annual taxes payable by private persons 
earning an income of around the minimum 
wage grew from Huf 58,000 to Huf 126,000 
on average, while the tax liabilities of taxpay-
ers earning an average income decreased from 
Huf 312,000 to Huf 299,000. 
As the change of the tax burden on indi-
viduals with taxable income was influenced by 
Table 1
THE IMPACT OF TAX CHANGES ON THE TAX LIABILITIES OF INCOME DECILES
Deciles Income bracket  
(HUF thousand)
Average annual tax 
(HUF thousand)
Ratio of total taxes Total tax change 
(HUF billion)
Minimum Maximum 2010 2013 2010 2013
1 – 212.2 6.2 16.0 0.2 0.6 4.3
2 212.2 523.4 16.6 54.9 0.4 2.0 16.8
3 523.4 858.6 27.2 94.5 0.7 3.5 29.5
4 858.6 1,103.2 58.0 125.9 1.5 4.6 29.7
5 1,103.2 1,276.1 92.0 149.8 2.5 5.5 25.3
6 1,276.1 1,596.0 135.0 182.3 3.6 6.7 20.7
7 1,596.0 1,980.5 211.2 229.8 5.6 8.4 8.1
8 1,980.5 2,609.5 311.8 298.2 8.3 10.9 –5.9
9 2,609.5 3,880.3 593.1 429.5 15.8 15.7 –71.6
10 3,880.3 – 2,302.2 1,157.8 61.3 42.3 –500.7
together 375.3 273.9 100.0 100.0 –443.8
Source: own calculations
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other factors apart from the size of the income 
(number of dependent children, spouse’s in-
come, type of income), therefore, when it 
comes to the consequences, individuals in the 
same income decile do not form a cohesive 
cluster either. for that reason, further exami-
nations require the division of taxpayers into 
three groups: winners are those whose annual 
tax in 2013 is at least one thousand forints 
lower than in 2010. The group of losers in-
clude individuals whose tax in 2013 is at least 
1000 forints higher than in 2010. Individuals 
whose tax changed into neither direction by 
more than 1000 forints are classified into the 
group of unaffected persons. (See Chart 1)
figure 1 Percentage of Winners, Losers, 
and unaffected Persons in the Income Deciles
In the lower four income deciles, the num-
ber of winners is around 20 per cent, and this 
ratio increases by as little as 15 percentage 
points in the next four income deciles as well. 
A substantial shift is only apparent in the two 
highest income deciles: the proportion of win-
ners in the ninth decile is 92 per cent, while 
in the highest income group it is 99 per cent.
By jointly looking at all private individu-
als who filed a tax return and had taxable in-
come, we have found the number of winners 
to be 1.7 million with an annual tax decrease 
of Huf  364,000 on average, and the num-
ber of losers to be 2.5 million with an annual 
tax increase of Huf 75,000 on average. for 
132,000 individuals, the change of the tax 
was less than Huf 1,000.
As the tax reform changed the tax liabilities 
of citizens mainly in relation to their income 
and the number of their children, the exami-
nation should focus on the consequences trig-
gered by the transformation of the personal 
income tax system along these two dimensions 
Chart 1
PERCENTAGE OF WINNERS, LOSERS, AND UNAFFECTED PERSONS IN  
THE INCOME DECILES
Source: own calculations
Winner Unaffected Loser
 focus – The impact of economic legislation on real processes 
377
jointly. since the tax change for persons with 
one dependent child or for two dependent 
children does not differ markedly, for the sake 
of simplification and for better clarity, they 
will be jointly treated hereinafter, and three 
categories are formed accordingly: childless 
persons (1), persons with one or two depen-
dent children (2) and persons with three or 
more dependent children (3).
Whereas 77 per cent of those who filed a 
tax return are childless (or did not claim a 
family tax allowance granted after children), 
the change in the tax burden on the latter 
does not differ significantly from that of the 
whole population (see Table 2). In all of the 
lower eight income deciles, the ratio of losers 
is at least 70 per cent, while the opposite is 
true for those with the highest income. When 
expressed in forints this means that the total 
tax increase of Huf  171  billion translates 
into an additional tax of Huf  62,000 on 
average and annually for those in the lower 
eight deciles. In contrast, the tax of childless 
persons belonging to the two highest income 
deciles has decreased by Huf  330  billion, 
which suggests that 74 per cent of the total 
budget cost of the tax reform increases the net 
income of childless people in the two highest 
income deciles.
As regards persons with one or two depen-
dent children in the lower four income de-
ciles, the proportion of those unaffected by 
or losing from the change is close to fifty per 
cent altogether, despite the adoption of the 
family tax allowance (see Table 3).
This can be explained by the fact that in 
Hungary neither the family tax allowance, nor 
the reduction of the tax rate, nor the elimina-
tion of the super grossing could compensate 
for the phasing out of tax credits. By contrast, 
almost all individuals in the highest income 
decile are winners. As a result of the processes 
described above, 85 per cent of the persons 
with one or two dependent children were 
required to pay a lower tax, and only 4 per 
cent had to pay an increased amount. Tax cuts 
Table 2
THE IMPACT OF THE TAX CHANGE ON CHILDLESS PRIVATE PERSONS 
Deciles Winner 
%
Loser
%
Unaffected 
%
Total 
persons
Total tax change 
HUF billion
Average annual 
tax change 
HUF
1 23 70 7 426,756 4.3 10,172
2 16 84 1 407,741 17.1 42,009
3 10 89 0 371,077 30.1 81,159
4 12 88 0 331,125 31.8 95,908
5 11 89 0 317,962 29.6 93,083
6 7 93 0 312,130 26.9 86,040
7 9 91 0 303,699 19.6 64,418
8 9 90 0 297,801 11.3 38,083
9 89 9 2 302,341 –32.3 –106,903
10 98 0 2 292,060 –297.4 –1,018,324
together 27 72 1 3,362,692 –159.0 –47,293
Source: own calculations
 focus – The impact of economic legislation on real processes  
378
granted for all of the taxpayers with one or 
two dependent children represent a revenue 
loss of Huf  218  billion in the budget, 83 
per cent of which amount increases the net 
income of those in the two highest income 
deciles.
In the case of three or more dependent chil-
dren, the distribution is substantially different 
from the earlier patterns. In comparison to 
persons with one or two dependent children, 
there are much fewer winners in the lower in-
come deciles (maximum 22 per cent) and the 
number of those whose tax liability remained 
the same is much higher. This may be traced 
back to the fact that taxpayers with three or 
more dependent children were eligible for a 
smaller family tax allowance already before 
the implementation of the tax reform.18 As a 
result, some of the families with low incomes 
were not required to pay taxes in 2010, either. 
This implies that despite a radical increase of 
the tax relief granted after children (comple-
mented with other changes), these modifi-
cations were not reducing their tax burden 
(further), since there is no negative tax in 
Hungary and consequently their net income 
did not increase. (See Table 4)
All the above factors leave their mark on the 
aggregate effects as well. While the tax reform 
offered a total of Huf 67 billion of tax reduc-
tion for persons with three or more dependent 
children, 92 per cent of this amount increased 
the net income of taxpayers in the top two in-
come deciles, and the tax of large families in 
the lower six income deciles did not change 
markedly. This explains that while the tax of 63 
per cent of all large families decreased, it was 
substantially unchanged for 33 per cent and 4 
per cent was required to pay a higher tax.
Decomposing the tax reform
The tax changes adopted in the period 
between 2010 and 2013 may be divided 
into four separate measures: the expansion 
Table 3
THE IMPACT OF THE TAX CHANGE ON PERSONS WITH ONE OR TWO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Deciles Winner 
%
Loser
%
Unaffected 
%
Total 
persons
Total tax change 
HUF billion
Average annual 
tax change 
HUF
1 50 17 34 8,205 0.0 –6,079
2 55 13 32 23,971 –0.4 –16,894
3 42 29 29 55,299 –0.7 –12,922
4 43 51 6 91,518 –2.0 –21,520
5 85 12 2 103,712 –4.0 –38,915
6 94 6 0 108,166 –5.8 –53,703
7 97 3 0 114,854 –9.9 –86,456
8 99 1 0 119,517 –13.8 –115,089
9 100 0 0 115,489 –30.5 –264,454
10 100 0 0 121,235 –151.0 –1,245,212
together 85 11 4 861,966 –218.2 –253,111
Source: own calculations
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of the family tax allowance; the adoption of 
the flat tax rate (for merged and separately 
taxed incomes); the phasing out of the 
super grossing system; the abolition of tax 
credits. As some of these measures have been 
implemented in several steps, and the effects 
of the particular measures may be combined in 
the examination of annual changes, therefore 
in the interest of decomposing the aggregate 
effects it seems most appropriate to classify 
the consequences along the above mentioned 
measures and not on annual bases. In the 
first step, we will describe what changes these 
measures would have induced separately in 
comparison to the taxation practices in 2010, 
in other words, if they had been implemented 
in 2010, leaving all other effective tax rules 
unchanged. It must be emphasised that the 
sum of the individually measured effects does 
not correspond to the aggregate impact of the 
changes adopted between 2010 and 2013, 
since the presence of any one measure may 
influence the effect of another measure, and 
vice versa. Having said that, a decomposition 
thus completed can still highlight the separate 
directions in which these four measures 
transform taxation practices.
The expansion of the family tax allowance 
means a tax cut of nearly Huf 173 billion, 
59 per cent of which is a tax reduction for 
the two deciles with the highest incomes. (see 
Table 5).
The adoption of a flat tax rate, i.e. the abo-
lition of the upper tax rate, and the reduction 
of the lower tax rate, together with the expan-
sion of the latter to separately taxed incomes, 
would have meant a loss of tax revenues of 
Huf 408 billion in itself. since the most im-
portant one of these steps is the abolition of 
the upper tax rate which only affected the de-
cile with the highest income, and they are the 
same taxpayers who have higher than average 
separately taxed income, it explains why 83 
per cent of the tax cut actually increases their 
net income. The same applies to the termi-
nation of the super grossing system, which 
Table 4
THE IMPACT OF THE TAX CHANGE ON PERSONS WITH THREE OR MORE DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Deciles Winner 
%
Loser
%
Unaffected 
%
Total 
persons
Total tax change 
HUF billion
Average annual 
tax change 
HUF
1 2 20 78 2,543 0.0 3,597
2 1 15 84 5,793 0.0 5,930
3 9 11 79 11,127 0.1 5,503
4 19 8 73 14,862 –0.1 –6,101
5 22 7 70 15,830 –0.3 –15,904
6 35 6 59 17,227 –0.4 –20,357
7 92 2 6 18,933 –1.5 –78,861
8 98 1 1 20,186 –3.5 –174,945
9 99 0 1 19,674 –8.7 –441,682
10 100 0 0 24,209 –52.3 –2,159,977
together 63 4 33 150,384 –66.6 –442,823
Source: own calculations
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would, by nature, offer everyone a tax reduc-
tion which would be different in its amount, 
but identical in its proportion. Nevertheless, 
due to tax credits, not yet phased out in 2010, 
and an upper tax rate applicable to those with 
the highest incomes, the average tax reduction 
is significantly different in the particular in-
come deciles.
The only measure which would have in it-
self increased tax revenues was the abolition of 
the tax credit. By way of derogation from the 
original purposes, in 2010 the tax credit was 
not only eligible to those with the lowest in-
come levels, but it was a tax reduction option 
available to everyone, with the exception of 
the highest-income taxpayers; consequently, 
the impact of the Huf 468 billion of tax rise 
arising from the abolition of the option also 
spreads over the bottom nine income deciles.
The decomposition of changes also reveals 
that the lowering of tax burdens linked to 
bringing up children is proportionally less 
than one fifth of the income-related tax cuts, 
while in terms of its impact, the only revenue 
boosting measure (tax credit) may also be 
classified among the latter ones.
Impact of  the potential adoption of   
a single digit income tax rate
using the previously described method, we have 
also examined how the adoption of a 9 per cent 
flat tax rate would affect budget revenues and tax 
burdens. It must be noted, however, that similar-
ly to our other analyses, this option, as well as the 
2013 legal framework we used as a benchmark, 
was simulated on the 2011 database.
Table 5
THE TAX PAYMENT EFFECTS OF THE PARTICULAR MEASURES BY INCOME DECILES  
(HUF billion)
Deciles
Expansion of the 
family tax allowance
Introduction of a 
single (flat) tax rate
Abolition of super 
grossing
Phasing out of the tax 
credit
Total 
change 
Average 
change 
(%)
Total 
change
Average 
change 
(%)
Total 
change
Average 
change 
(%)
Total 
change
Average 
change 
(%)
1 –0.1 –3 –0.5 –17 –0.5 –19 6.9 253
2 –0.5 –7 –1.1 –15 –2.0 –28 26.9 369
3 –1.4 –12 –1.9 –16 –4.2 –36 51.5 433
4 –4.8 –19 –5.5 –22 –13.9 –55 64.7 255
5 –9.0 –22 –6.7 –17 –22.4 –56 68.2 170
6 –13.2 –22 –8.4 –14 –27.2 –46 72.6 123
7 –18.8 –20 –10.8 –12 –35.0 –38 72.1 78
8 –23.8 –17 –14.1 –10 –45.5 –33 72.8 53
9 –28.8 –11 –21.0 –8 –90.5 –35 31.8 12
10 –72.9 –7 –338.0 –34 –243.1 –24 0.0 0
together –173.4 –11 –407.9 –25 –484.5 –30 467.6 28
Source: own calculations
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Based on the 2011 data, it appears that the 
replacement of the 16 per cent tax rate with 
a 9 per cent tax rate would reduce total bud-
get revenues from personal income tax by 
Huf 521.8 billion, that is by 44 per cent. Giv-
en the nature of the change, the tax reduction 
is spread among private persons in different in-
come deciles in accordance with the extent to 
which the particular deciles contribute to the 
total of tax revenues. Accordingly, 42 per cent 
of the overall tax reduction, i.e. Huf 219 bil-
lion will increase the net income of those in the 
top income decile. (See Table 6).
If such a scenario happens, the net wage of 
taxable private persons would increase by an 
annual Huf 119,000 on average, which is a 
monthly tax reduction of Huf 9,900, assum-
ing 12 months of employment. In the bottom 
five income deciles the adoption of a single 
digit income tax would entail an annual tax 
decrease of Huf  39,000 on average, while 
those with higher incomes would on average 
earn Huf 200,000 higher net wages.
A smaller tax, however, also mitigates 
the significance of the family tax allowance. 
Based on the 2011 data it seems that while 
in 2013 the family tax allowance reduces 
the tax of those with dependent children by 
Huf  195  billion, the adoption of a 9 per 
cent tax rate would decrease that amount to 
Huf 110 billion.
sUmmARy
The flat tax reform implemented between 
2010 and 2013 triggered a significant change 
in the tax burdens of certain social groups and 
their contribution to total tax revenues. for a 
total of 2.5 million taxpayers, their annual tax 
increased by Huf 75,000 on average, while 
1.7 million people had to pay Huf 364,000 
less tax annually. The tax change was less than 
Huf  1,000 for 132,000 people. from the 
aspect of the tax change, the key factor was 
the size of the income, followed by the num-
Table 6
THE IMPACT OF THE ADOPTION OF A 9 PER CENT TAX RATE
Deciles
Total taxes (HUF billion) Average annual tax (HUF thousand)
16% 9% Change 16% 9% Change
1 7.0 4.0 –3.0 16.0 9.2 –6.8
2 24.0 13.6 –10.5 54.9 31.0 –23.9
3 41.4 23.2 –18.1 94.5 53.1 –41.5
4 55.1 30.9 –24.1 125.9 70.7 –55.1
5 65.6 36.9 –28.7 149.8 84.2 –65.6
6 79.8 44.8 –35.0 182.3 102.3 –80.0
7 100.5 56.5 –44.1 229.8 129.0 –100.7
8 130.5 73.2 –57.2 298.2 167.4 –130.8
9 187.9 105.6 –82.3 429.5 241.4 –188.1
10 506.5 287.7 –218.8 1157.8 657.6 –500.2
together 1,198.2 676.4 –521.8 273.9 154.6 –119.3
Source: own calculations
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1 for more details, see the study of carone et al. 
(2007).
2 It must be emphasised that flat tax systems may 
indeed vary greatly. In the following, the systems 
we consider flat tax systems are those where the 
income of private individuals is taxedat a single 
taxrate, irrespectively of any tax benefit sorrelieves 
and whe ther or not the same taxrate is applied too 
ther tax types as well. 
3 scharle et al. (2010) came to similar conclusions 
from the examination of the efficiency of tax 
systems. They suggested that a simple and more 
transparent tax system improves taxation morale 
while the reform (demonstrating the government’s 
strength) may enhance the country’s ability to at-
tract capital.
4 The lower than expected increase of tax revenues 
may be traced back to two possible reasons. first, 
tax evasion was only reduced in countries where 
the taxrate of the personal income tax was the 
same as that of the corporate income tax. second, 
the employment impact of there duction of the 
tax on labour was also lower than expected. This is 
elaborated in more detail in the study of Gray et al. 
(2007).
5 The social costs and efficiency of tax systems and 
different taxes are described at length in the paper 
of Bakos et al. (2008b).
6 source: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/05/25/
uk-romania-politics-iduKBRE84o0JE20120525 
(Downloaded on: 05.07.2013)
7 source: http://www.gov.ro/pm-victor-ponta-2013-is-
the-year-in-which-not-only-through-budget-and-fis-
cal-measures-but-through-a-joint-effort-as-well-can-
we-consolidate-the__l2a119428.html (Downloaded 
on: 05.07.2013)
8 The study of Kiss and Mosberger (2011) examined 
the taxation elasticity of higher income Hungarian 
taxpayers and came to a similar conclusion: the es-
timated elasticity was 0.2.
9 The hypothetical tax system has the following 
characteristics: The taxrate on in comes in ex-
cess of the statutory minimum wage of 2005 is 
30.3 per cent, with a 13.5 per cent social secu-
rity contribution. Tax allowances and deductions 
are eliminated. Bakos et al. (2008a) selected the 
single taxrate to devise a system which would be 
neutral interms of budget revenues, excluding the 
behavioural reaction, although the single taxrate 
ber of dependent children. The contribution 
of the top income decile to total tax revenues 
shrank from 61 per cent to 42 per cent. 74 
per cent of the tax reduction of Huf 444 bil-
lion achieved as a result of the tax reform in-
creased the net income of childless taxpayers 
in the top two income deciles. 85 per cent 
of the taxpayers with one or two dependent 
children had to pay at least Huf 1,000 less 
tax on an annual basis, while for persons with 
three or more children, this ratio is only 63 
per cent. This latter may be explained by the 
fact that these taxpayers were eligible for a 
smaller family tax allowance even before: as 
many of them were not required to pay any 
tax before the reform, the average tax liability 
of persons with dependent children did not 
decrease markedly in the bottom six income 
deciles. Reducing the tax rate to 9 per cent 
would result in a further 44 per cent decrease 
of budget revenues from personal income tax, 
which – on the basis of the 2011 data – would 
mean a loss of an additional Huf 522 billion 
of tax revenues on an annual basis.
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